The Struggle over Executive Appointments by Roberts, John C.
Utah Law Review
Volume 2014 | Number 4 Article 2
8-2014
The Struggle over Executive Appointments
John C. Roberts
Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the President/Executive Department Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Utah Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Law Review by an
authorized editor of Utah Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact valeri.craigle@law.utah.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roberts, John C. (2014) "The Struggle over Executive Appointments," Utah Law Review: Vol. 2014 : No. 4 , Article 2.
Available at: https://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr/vol2014/iss4/2
THE STRUGGLE OVER EXECUTIVE APPOINTMENTS 
 
John C. Roberts∗ 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The remarkable men who created our national Constitution created a system 
of government consisting of three separate branches—each with discrete and 
specified powers—designed to ensure that governmental power could not be 
abused. That system has served us well, though it may seem cumbersome and is 
not always wholly democratic. But in several crucial areas the Framers created 
shared or overlapping powers between the two political branches. The precise 
boundaries of that sharing between the President and Congress was left ambiguous, 
giving rise to an enduring tension that has ebbed and flowed throughout our 
history. One such area of shared power concerns waging war, where Congress was 
given the power to declare war and to appropriate funds for its support, but the 
President was appointed Commander and Chief of the Armed Forces. In the 
twentieth century, Congress and the President sparred repeatedly over the ability of 
the President to deploy military forces throughout the world without a declaration 
of war.1 The constitutional standoff has continued, and the resolution in each case 
has remained firmly in the political arena.  
Another such area is the appointment of federal judges and executive 
officials, which was a highly divisive subject during the constitutional convention.2 
The debate revealed deep differences among the Framers on the role of the 
President and the balance between the executive and legislative branches. The 
result is an Appointments Clause that does not give full power over appointments 
either to the President or to Congress. In a complicated structure, the President 
nominates judges and Officers of the United States, but the Senate is given the 
power to advise and consent to such nominations. Different constitutional 
mechanisms govern the appointment of lesser governmental officials. Senate 
participation in the two general types of appointments—federal judges and 
∗ © 2014 John C. Roberts. Dean Emeritus and Professor of Law Emeritus, DePaul 
University College of Law. I am indebted to Mark Giangrande of DePaul’s Rinn Law 
Library for research assistance on congressional materials. While serving as General 
Counsel to the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services from 1977 to 1980, I 
benefitted immeasurably from the guidance of both the Office of Senate Legislative 
Counsel and the Office of the Parliamentarian. 
1 On the war powers issue, see generally LOUIS FISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 284–301 (6th ed. 2005) (describing the history surrounding the President’s war 
powers, including the President’s ability to declare war, military tribunals, the War Powers 
Resolution, and related cases); 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
§ 4-6, at 657–70 (3d ed. 2000) (juxtaposing the President’s powers as Commander-in-Chief 
with Congress’s power to declare war).  
2 See generally MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 15–38 
(2000) (describing the Founders’ varying positions on the Appointments Clause). 
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administrative officials—arguably has different constitutional justifications. In the 
case of federal judges, who are appointed for life, it is understandable and 
appropriate that the two elected branches should share power to appoint members 
of the third branch, which then operates largely independent of them.  
In the case of executive branch functionaries—including members of the 
cabinet, lower ranking officials, and more recently, members of a bewildering 
variety of administrative entities—giving a veto power over such appointments to 
the Senate stands in obvious conflict with the President’s constitutional duty to 
take care that the laws passed by Congress are “faithfully executed.”3 And 
practically speaking, such a veto may prevent the President from choosing officials 
to serve with him in carrying out what he sees as his popular mandate to govern the 
country in line with his articulated policies. To make matters worse, some 
important questions are left unanswered or ambiguous in the constitutional text. 
Where is the line between “Officers of the United States,” which require Senate 
approval, and lesser ranking officials, who do not?4 Must the Senate explicitly vote 
nominations up or down, or may it do nothing, and if so, what are the 
consequences?5 May the Senate by legislation constrain the President’s selection 
by mandating certain qualifications?6 Who may remove which officials, and on 
what grounds?7 Most importantly for this discussion, what can the President do 
when he wishes to make an appointment but the Senate is not available to exercise 
its constitutional consent power? 
Given the President’s strong political and practical motivation to get on with 
the day-to-day business of government and the Senate’s desire to preserve its 
prerogatives against executive ambitions, it is not surprising that the appointments 
process has been a source of constant struggle between the branches from the very 
first Congress.8 That struggle has been exacerbated not only by the ambiguities in 
the constitutional text, but also by the enormous changes in the size and 
complexity of government since 1789. As the President and Congress have battled 
over nominations through the years, each has developed devices to give itself the 
advantage, thus escalating the tension and ill feeling between the branches. The 
struggle has reached a new level in the last fifty years, with the arguments resting 
not only on political grounds, but also on constitutional ones as well. The 
constitutional concerns have more recently centered on the Recess Appointments 
3 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
4 See GERHARDT, supra note 2, at 158–61 (discussing the interpretations of “Officer 
of the United States”).  
5 See Mathew C. Stephenson, Can the President Appoint Principal Executive Officers 
Without a Senate Confirmation Vote?, 122 YALE L.J. 940, 950–58 (2013). 
6 See GERHARDT, supra note 2, at 273–80. 
7 The key case here is probably Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), which dealt 
with the constitutional status of the independent counsel. See generally TRIBE, supra note 
1, at 680–99 (discussing Morrison v. Olson and the independent counsel statute). 
8 The best overall survey is GERHARDT, supra note 2. 
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Clause,9 which allows the President to bypass Senate advice and consent by 
making temporary appointments when the Senate is not in session. 
This Article argues that the long-term struggle between the President and the 
Senate over executive appointments has now reached a crisis and that we may be 
approaching a point where the President’s crucial duty to take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed is significantly impaired. During the Obama administration, an 
unprecedented number of judgeships and executive branch positions remain 
unfilled, threatening the smooth functioning of government at an especially 
demanding time.10  
Republican opposition is increasingly based on extraneous political issues, not 
on the merits of each nominee.11 Pervasive obstruction by the minority in the 
Senate prevents action on nominations and forces the President to assert broad 
powers under the Recess Appointments Clause to make temporary appointments. 
Most importantly, two recent developments threaten to completely undo the 
tenuous compromises that historically have been observed between the branches. 
One is the assertion by the Senate that through its brief pro forma sessions during 
longer periods of absence from Washington, it can completely negate the 
President’s recess appointments power. The second is a recent decision by a panel 
of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia that takes an extremely 
narrow view of the Recess Appointments Clause, overriding a complex series of 
interpretations shared by the executive and legislative branches that have allowed 
the Clause to function in the modern administrative state.12 
9 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
10 For executive appointments, one-quarter of key policy-making positions remained 
vacant after President Obama’s first eighteen months in office, and almost 20% remained 
so after two years. WILLIAM A. GALSTON & E.J. DIONNE, JR., A HALF-EMPTY 
GOVERNMENT CAN’T GOVERN: WHY EVERYONE WANTS TO FIX THE APPOINTMENTS 
PROCESS, WHY IT NEVER HAPPENS, AND HOW WE CAN GET IT DONE 1–2 (2010). Senate 
delays were a major cause. At the end of their first years in office, President George W. 
Bush saw 8% of his nominees awaiting confirmation as compared with President Obama’s 
20%. Id. at 9. In March of 2010, 217 nominations were pending in the Senate. Seventy-
seven had cleared committee and were awaiting floor action, including forty-four that had 
been pending for more than a month. Brian C. Kalt, Politics and the Federal Appointments 
Process, HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE (April 5, 2011), http://digitalcommons.law.msu.e 
du/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1467&context=facpubs.  
11 See also THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT 
LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW 
POLITICS OF EXTREMISM 98–100 (2012) (discussing the Republican tactic of blocking 
judicial nominations even while acknowledging the competence and integrity of the 
nominees). 
12 Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted sub nom. 
NLRB v. Noel Canning, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (2013). Two other circuit panels, using somewhat 
different reasoning than the D.C. Circuit, made similar rulings later in 2013 by divided 
votes. NLRB v. Enter. Leasing Co., 722 F.3d 609 (4th Cir. 2013); NLRB v. New Vista 
Nursing & Rehab., 719 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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If the Senate minority continues to obstruct even routine executive 
nominations, and if the courts essentially eliminate the President’s recess 
appointments power, the country will face a dangerous shift in the constitutional 
relationship between the branches. These two recent developments make it urgent 
to address the struggle over appointments and to restore a workable balance of 
power between the President and the Senate. This Article attempts to outline the 
nature of the crisis we face in more detail and to propose a course of action for the 
future. Because the appointment of federal judges presents a somewhat different 
set of issues, the discussion focuses on appointments to executive branch positions 
requiring Senate advice and consent. Now numbering well over one thousand, 
these positions include cabinet and subcabinet officials, as well as administrators 
working in a variety of both departmental and independent agencies and 
commissions.13 The men and women who occupy them direct the thousands of 
offices around the country that profoundly affect the lives of individual citizens, 
along with their businesses and civil institutions. To Americans in their daily lives, 
these men and women are “the government.” 
In what follows, Part II identifies the structure, background, and history of the 
Recess Appointments Clause, and Part III examines the threat to effective 
governance posed by recent legal and political developments. Part IV provides an 
analysis of legal issues raised by the Senate’s practices and recent court decisions 
on recess appointments. Part V outlines recommendations for restoring the balance 
between the branches on executive appointments. 
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
A.  Structure and Background of the Appointments Clause 
 
To resolve the important issue of which branch of government would control 
the appointment of judges and executive officials, the Framers opted for shared 
power between the President and the Senate and created three different methods of 
appointment.14 For “Officers of the United States,” which were not defined in the 
text of the Constitution, the President was given the power to nominate and the 
Senate the power to advise and consent, which is also not further delineated in the 
text. For inferior officers, Congress may by legislation choose the method of 
appointment, which might be by the President alone or by cabinet officers or other 
high-ranking officials, all without individual approval by the Senate. “Advice and 
Consent” was generally interpreted as “approval” from the beginning and is now 
generally referred to as “confirmation.” The third method of appointment was 
intended to deal with the situation where the President needed to appoint an 
Officer of the United States, but the Senate was not available to perform its 
constitutional role. Because Congress’s workload was light and travel to and from 
13 See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency 
Positions, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 913, 917 (2009). 
14 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 
                                                     
2014] EXECUTIVE APPOINTMENTS 729 
the capital was difficult, it was expected that Congress would meet for short 
working sessions followed by long recesses as members returned home. Under 
those circumstances, some additional mechanism was clearly necessary. Thus, the 
President was given the power in the Recess Appointments Clause to appoint 
officers during Senate recesses, to serve only until the end of the following session 
of the Senate.15  
Alexander Hamilton explained in The Federalist #76 that the Senate was 
expected to be deferential in exercising its confirmation power, presumably 
because of the President’s role as executor of the laws, and would only reject 
nominations for “special and strong reasons.”16 He and other Framers made it clear 
that the Recess Appointments Clause was included to ensure that important 
judicial and executive positions did not remain unfilled during breaks in the 
Senate’s work and that the important day-to-day functioning of government would 
continue.17 This attitude reflected the general concern among the leaders of the day 
that the lack of a strong executive function under the Articles of Confederation had 
been a major cause of the weakness and ineffectiveness of the national government 
before the Constitution was adopted.18 The temporary duration of recess 
appointments, on the other hand, preserved the essentials of the Senate’s approval 
power.  
It is important to note that the Framers used terms such as “recess,” “session,” 
and “adjournment” in the Constitution but did not define them in its text. Then, as 
now, these words are not terms of art but have vague and varied meanings. The 
Framers had experience with state legislatures in which the terms were used and 
unfortunate memories of the chaotic and ineffective Confederation Congress,19 but 
they left the job of defining these key terms on which the Appointments Clause 
depends to a Congress that had yet to be elected. They even explicitly granted the 
exclusive power to create procedural rules to the House and Senate separately.20 
Thus, those who wrote the Recess Appointments Clause had no way of knowing 
exactly how it would work because the key terms were yet to be defined and their 
meanings could be changed by the Senate over time. Fearing the kinds of 
15 Id. cl. 3.  
16 THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton). 
17 THE FEDERALIST NO. 67 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[I]t might be necessary for the 
public service to fill [vacant positions] without delay . . . .”); Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 
1220, 1226 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (describing “what we understand to be the main 
purpose of the Recess Appointments Clause—to enable the President to fill vacancies to 
assure the proper functioning of our government”).  
18 See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 131–35 (2005); 
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 547–53 
(1969). 
19 A principal motivation behind the 1787 Constitutional Convention was frustration 
over the dysfunction and powerlessness of government under the Articles of Confederation. 
See John C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A 
Reply to Professors Posner and Vermeule, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1773, 1799–1805 (2003). 
20 See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 5–6.  
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attendance problems they had encountered under the Articles, they adopted only 
one specific requirement—that the Congress meet at least once each year, no later 
than the first Monday in December.21 
 
B.  Historical Evolution of the Appointments Clause  
 
Though the text of the Appointments Clause might suggest that it is a neutral 
housekeeping provision, appointments were controversial and highly political from 
the very first Congress.22 The power struggle we now discuss was present from the 
beginning, and both sides sometimes acted from political motives divorced from 
the qualifications of the nominee. President Washington’s effort to appoint John 
Rutledge to the United States Supreme Court was only the first example.23 The rise 
of contentious political parties, which the Framers did not take into account, made 
matters worse. Though the level of conflict rose and fell over the years, there were 
periods of intense controversy over appointments, especially after the Civil War. In 
the twentieth century, we saw profound changes in both the presidency and the 
Senate, which must be taken into account in giving modern meaning to the Recess 
Appointments Clause. 
The early executive branch was tiny by today’s standards.24 We now have 
many more cabinet departments, along with myriad executive agencies and offices. 
Since the New Deal, there has been a dramatic rise in the number of independent 
administrative agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the 
Federal Communications Commission, and the National Labor Relations Board, 
which wield important quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers pursuant to 
delegations from Congress. That factor alone has raised the stakes in the 
appointments process because Congress seeks to control some of the power it has 
given away by influencing the appointment of members of commissions and 
agencies. It has attempted to exercise its power not only through its approval of 
individual nominations, but also by vastly increasing the number of lower ranking 
officials whose appointments require Senate action. There are fourteen advice-and-
consent appointees in the EPA alone.25 Likewise, the high turnover of cabinet and 
subcabinet appointees in modern times places additional strain on the appointments 
process. 
It seems indisputable that the power of the presidency has increased greatly 
since the founding period, adding to concerns in Congress over erosion of its 
influence. Whatever the causes and contours of this accretion of power, it is a 
21 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2. The annual meeting date was changed to January 3 by 
constitutional amendment in 1933. U.S CONST. amend. XX, § 2.  
22 See GERHARDT, supra note 2, at 45–77. 
23 Id. at 51–52. Professor Gerhardt notes that a minor executive nomination by 
President Washington was rejected barely three months into the first session of the first 
Congress, apparently because Senators from the state preferred another candidate. Id. at 
63–64. 
24 See O’Connell, supra note 13, at 922–23. 
25 Id. at 931. 
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reality. Commentators have cited the President’s power over the policy choices of 
key agencies and commissions, the concentration of power in the large White 
House staff, the use of executive orders to essentially bypass the legislative 
process, the acceptance of executive agreements as an alternative to treaties, and 
the President’s crucial daily access to the media to push his policy agenda.26 All of 
these factors, and more, add up to an increasing threat to the power of Congress 
and play a part in the escalation of obstruction in the Senate since 1980. 
The modern Senate is also a different institution than it was when the first 
Congress met, and these changes have dramatically affected the struggle over 
executive appointments. In many ways, the Senate plays a different role than that 
envisaged by the Framers. It is much more activist and more powerful, moving 
from its primary role of protecting the interests of the states. The early Senate was 
very small and operated like an intimate private club composed of the leading men 
of the day. Today’s Senate has one hundred members, elected directly and highly 
varied in experience and outlook. The work schedule of the Senate has also 
evolved from the one anticipated by the Framers—short sessions followed by long 
recesses each year. Members of the Senate and the House can now travel to and 
from their home states with ease. Accordingly, they meet for longer sessions with 
many short breaks interspersed. From 2001 to 2010, for example, the Senate was 
actually in session about 45% of the time, with recesses averaging eighteen days, 
with the longest fifty-six days.27 Internal Senate rules and practices have also 
evolved significantly over time. Unknown in the early Senate, the filibuster is now 
a commonplace parliamentary device that has come close to paralyzing the body.28 
The Senate also allows holds on legislation and nominations by individual 
members29 and traditionally requires consultation (if not more) with home state 
senators on many judgeships and executive nominations.30 There is much greater 
control of the advice-and-consent process by Senate committees and with that 
comes much deeper scrutiny of nominees’ policy positions and backgrounds.31  
In the aggregate, these changes in the Senate have made it much more 
difficult and time-consuming for the President to obtain approval of executive-
branch nominees. By far the most important change in the culture and operation of 
the Senate in recent years, and the change that most severely affects the struggle 
over appointments, is the unprecedented increase in political polarization that has 
26 The literature on presidential power is enormous. A useful summary of current 
issues involving increased presidential authority is Developments in the Law—Presidential 
Authority, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2057 (2012). 
27 Kalt, supra note 10, at 2 n.16. 
28 See generally John C. Roberts, Gridlock and Senate Rules, 88 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 2189 (2013) (discussing the use of Senate rules by the minority to create gridlock in 
Washington). 
29 Id. at 2196. 
30 See GERHARDT, supra note 2, at 143–54. 
31 See G. Calvin Mackenzie, The State of the Presidential Appointments Process, in 
INNOCENT UNTIL NOMINATED: THE BREAKDOWN OF THE PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS 
PROCESS 1, 40–44 (G. Calvin Mackenzie ed., 2001). 
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occurred since the 1970s.32 Most issues are now defined by sharply contrasting 
party positions, discipline is rigid, and compromise is very difficult to achieve. 
Each side sees the other as not just mistaken, but evil or immoral, and the rhetoric 
is increasingly sharp. Coupled with the many and varied weapons for minority 
obstruction available to senators, this development has drastically altered the 
appointments process, creating a situation that those who adopted the 
Appointments Clause would not recognize.  
The great majority of executive-branch nominees have always been approved 
eventually because most do not present momentous issues from the Senate’s point 
of view.33 But this fact masks the ominous changes that have taken place in recent 
years. Since about 1980, we have seen increasing conflict between the President 
and the Senate on nominations to sensitive agency positions, subcabinet positions, 
and even on some seemingly unimportant posts.34 At first these refusals to confirm 
came in the regular order after a negative vote on the Senate floor, presumably as 
the Framers envisaged. At the same time, Congress expanded the number of 
positions requiring Senate confirmation and deepened its scrutiny of nominees’ 
backgrounds and finances. More recently, however, the Senate has exercised its 
confirmation power without a floor vote, either by lengthy delay, which resulted in 
a withdrawn nomination, or by minority obstruction of a final vote by either a 
filibuster or the threat of one.35 This has led modern presidents, beginning with 
Ronald Reagan, to increasingly use recess appointments to overcome the Senate’s 
new tactics and to interpret broadly the recess appointments power.36 Most 
recently, as we shall see in an examination of President Obama’s disputes with the 
Senate, the minority in that fiercely polarized body has begun to block votes on 
nominations for reasons completely unrelated to the merits of the nominee.37 Some 
of these acts of obstruction have grown out of opposition to the policy directions of 
32 See Roberts, supra note 28, at 2190. 
33 One study places the “failure rate” for executive nominations, including negative 
votes, withdrawals, and expired nominations, from 1885 through 1996 at 4.4%. Nolan 
McCarty & Rose Razaghian, Advice and Consent: Senate Responses to Executive Branch 
Nominations, 1885–1996, 43 AMER. J. POL. SCI. 1122, 1126 (1999). 
34 See Mackenzie, supra note 31, at 19–27 (2001); Burdett Loomis, The Senate: An 
“Obstacle Course” for Executive Appointments?, in INNOCENT UNTIL NOMINATED, supra 
note 31, at 160, 163–68. 
35 See Mackenzie, supra note 31, at 31–36. 
36 The Congressional Research Service has reported that presidents from Ronald 
Reagan through Barack Obama have made 652 recess appointments, about evenly divided 
between inter-and intrasession appointments. President Reagan made by far the most—
232—and President Obama (as of 2013) by far the fewest—thirty-two. HENRY HOGUE ET 
AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE NOEL CANNING DECISION AND RECESS APPOINTMENTS 
MADE FROM 1981–2013, at 4 tbl.1 (2013), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/m 
020413.pdf. 
37 See, e.g., Sarah A. Binder, The Senate as A Black Hole? Lessons Learned from the 
Judicial Appointments Experience, in INNOCENT UNTIL NOMINATED, supra note 31, at 173, 
176 (“Senators themselves will often admit that their willingness to delay a presidential 
nominee has little to do with the qualifications of the nominee.”).  
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the agency or department involved or from a desire to use the nomination process 
to prevent entirely the operation of the agency. Senators also have increasingly 
blocked nominations to extract unrelated concessions from the President. These 
motivations would surely have seemed unacceptable and unwise to those who 
devised the appointments process in the first place. Since in all the recent examples 
it was clear to observers that a majority of the Senate would vote in favor of the 
nominee if a floor vote were permitted, these minority tactics have become so 
blatant as to trigger threats of revising Senate rules either to restrict or eliminate 
filibusters and individual holds.38 
In sum, the current state of the appointments process seems far from that 
envisaged by Hamilton and his contemporaries. Even so, neither the White House 
nor the Senate has resorted to every possible tool in the struggle over executive 
nominations, probably out of fear that at some point a constitutional crisis could 
result. Until recently the rival branches have recognized the high stakes involved, 
particularly in making or blocking recess appointments, and have stepped back 
from the brink of confrontation. Good examples include the informal 
understanding in 1960 that the President would not make recess appointments to 
the Supreme Court39 and more recent agreements by presidents to refrain from 
making recess appointments in exchange for up-or-down votes on pending 
nominees.40 But the struggle over executive appointments, which has been slowly 
evolving in seriousness over time, but also moderated by mutual restraint, has now 
reached the point of crisis. 
 
III.  THE THREAT TO EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE 
 
Even before the events of 2012 and 2013 that brought to a head the continuing 
struggle over executive appointments, scholars and political observers became 
increasingly concerned that a general breakdown in the appointments process had 
38 A major effort was mounted by reformers, backed by Majority Leader Reid, to 
restrict filibusters at the start of the 113th Congress in January 2013. Minor modifications 
were made. Roberts, supra note 28, at 2213–14. A more serious effort, focused on 
restricting filibusters only for executive-branch nominations, was made in July 2013 and 
resulted in a number of confirmations but no permanent changes in rules or practices. See 
David Hawkings, Consumer Bureau Gets a Leader, and Dodd-Frank Gets an Enforcer, 
ROLL CALL (July 16, 2013, 5:49 PM), http://blogs.rollcall.com/hawkings/consumer-bureau- 
gets-a-leader-and-dodd-frank-gets-an-enforcer/; The Editorial Bd., The Senate Clings to the 
Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/17/opinion/the-s 
enate-clings-to-the-filibuster.html. 
39 See, e.g., 106 CONG. REC. 18145 (1960) (passing a resolution that recess 
appointments to the Supreme Court should not be made except under “unusual 
circumstances”). Presidents have not made recess appointments to the Supreme Court since 
and only rarely to lower federal courts. 
40 For a review of some recent political accommodations on recess appointments, see 
LOUIS FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31112, RECESS APPOINTMENTS OF FEDERAL 
JUDGES 9–13 (2001); Patrick Hein, In Defense of Broad Recess Appointment Power: The 
Effectiveness of Political Counterweights, 96 CAL. L. REV. 235, 252–56 (2008). 
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begun to seriously impair the efficient operation of the executive branch. Political 
Science researchers pointed out that since about 1980, delays in the confirmation 
process had resulted in an ever-increasing percentage of unfilled positions both in 
departmental offices and independent regulatory agencies.41 Several causes were 
identified, including expanded ethics screening, greater financial disclosure, and 
disorganization in the White House personnel offices, but a major cause of 
vacancies was surely procedural delays in the Senate.42 Compounding the trend 
was the significant expansion of the number of positions requiring Senate 
confirmation, a result of legislative changes aimed at increasing Congress’s control 
over executive policymaking. Minority obstruction made it increasingly difficult 
for a President to staff his administration even during periods when the presidency 
and the Senate were in the same hands. 
Ronald Reagan’s use of recess appointments stands as a useful illustration of 
the increasingly polarizing confrontation between the President and the Senate. 
Because of obstruction in the Senate, he resorted to a large number of recess 
appointments to independent agencies, allowing him to put into place his 
deregulatory policy regime.43 Recess appointments, which can last up to two years 
in the right circumstances, were particularly effective tools because appointees to 
such agencies usually serve for a relatively short period even when they receive 
regular appointments approved by the Senate. The trend continued in subsequent 
administrations, but use of recess appointments aroused much more controversy as 
the Senate saw its influence over agency policymaking eroding. President George 
W. Bush eventually stopped making recess appointments because of intense Senate 
opposition and new parliamentary tactics, including the first use of pro forma 
sessions.44 
During the period after 1980, we saw many more examples of action by the 
Senate to obstruct or disable executive policymaking through refusal to confirm 
key nominees. Democrats used such tactics against the second President Bush,45 
and Republicans accelerated them during the Obama administration, slowing down 
banking regulation by refusing to confirm key Treasury Department officials46 and 
refusing to vote on Elizabeth Warren’s nomination to head the new Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).47 Both parties stubbornly refused to act on 
nominations to the Federal Election Commission and the National Labor Relations 
41 By one estimate, 8% of total nominees were pending action in the Senate at the end 
of George H.W. Bush’s first year in office, compared to 20% at the end of Barack Obama’s 
first year. GALSTON & DIONNE, supra note 10, at 9.  
42 MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 94–98.  
43 See HOGUE ET AL., supra note 36, at 5–12 (noting President Reagan’s seventy-two 
intrasession recess appointments and 160 intersession recess appointments). 
44 See Ryan C. Black et al., Assessing Congressional Responses to Growing 
Presidential Powers: The Case of Recess Appointments, 41 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 570, 
580–81 (2011). 
45 Id.  
46 See MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 96–97. 
47 See id. at 99–100. 
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Board (NLRB) because of disagreement about the mission of those agencies. 
Senators even began to block nominees because of completely irrelevant 
disagreements with the President or even with their colleagues.48 Such practices 
raise serious constitutional questions since refusal to act by the Senate in those 
instances is based not on the merits of the nominees, as contemplated originally by 
the Framers, but on an effort to disable the office or agency involved or even to 
pursue a selfish personal or political goal. As the Supreme Court held in INS v. 
Chadha,49 Congress may not act in ways that have the effect of legislation without 
following the procedure laid down in Article I—passage of a bill by both houses 
followed by presentment to the President.50 When the Senate refuses to confirm 
any nominee to head the CFPB because it disagrees with its statutory mandate or 
blocks any appointment of assistant secretaries charged with implementing 
banking reform in order to prevent that reform, it is arguably overstepping its 
constitutional authority; its proper alternative is to amend the relevant statute. 
These tactics are even more constitutionally suspect because they are frequently 
not acts of a Senate majority, but are the result of minority obstruction through 
threatened filibusters, again not a tactic that would have been within the 
contemplation of those who wrote the Constitution.  
The President has alternatives to move forward with his policy initiatives and 
carry out legislatively mandated programs without achieving Senate confirmation 
of his nominees. He can use recess appointments, and has been increasingly driven 
to do so, but such appointments increase the conflict with the Senate and so may be 
politically undesirable. Moreover, they are temporary solutions. He may also use 
the Federal Vacancies Reform Act to appoint acting officers from within the 
executive branch, though the Act does not apply to independent administrative 
agencies.51 Scholars have pointed out that, aside from the political risks, these 
alternatives create officeholders who lack the gravitas or political credibility of 
confirmed appointees and, thus, impair the operation of the offices involved.52 
Presidents have increasingly resorted to another tactic to get around Senate 
obstruction by creating shadow officers within the White House, with titles such as 
Coordinator or Czar, who effectively control an office or agency without being 
appointed or confirmed.53 Ironically, this cycle of obstruction followed by 
presidential avoidance measures actually decreases the Senate’s influence over the 
executive branch. The more that important offices and agencies are run by officials 
48 See, e.g., MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 85 (“In February 2010, Senator 
Richard Shelby of Alabama put a blanket hold on all White House nominations for 
executive positions (over seventy were pending at the time) in order to get two earmarks 
with tens of billions of dollars fast-tracked for his state.”).  
49 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
50 Id. at 953–56. 
51 Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345–3349d (2012). 
52 See, e.g., O’Connell, supra note 13, at 937–46 (explaining that the costs of such 
alternative appointments include “agency inaction, confusion among nonpolitical workers, 
and decreased agency accountability”). 
53 See id. at 930–31. 
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with recess or acting appointments not involving the Senate, or even worse run 
unofficially by White House staff, the less power the Senate has to influence them 
through the normal course of committee hearings and confirmation interviews. The 
Senate’s current tactics then have the perverse effect of lessening its influence over 
the bureaucracy and ultimately increasing the power of the presidency.  
We come then to the events of 2011 and 2012 that escalated the conflict 
between President Obama and the Senate over several key appointments, leading 
to the controversial use of pro forma sessions to block recess appointments and to 
the D.C Circuit’s decision in the Noel Canning case.54  
Despite Barack Obama’s decisive victory in the 2008 election and 
comfortable Democratic majorities in both the House and Senate, the new 
President experienced unprecedented problems with executive appointments from 
the beginning of his administration. Republican Senators, manifesting the extreme 
partisanship and polarization that had been growing in Congress, vowed to block 
the President’s policies at all costs and rejected talk of compromise. In the midst of 
the gravest economic crisis since the Great Depression, minority senators used 
holds and threatened filibusters to delay over one hundred subcabinet and agency 
nominations.55 Though the administration also deserves some blame for the 
slowness of its selection and vetting process, minority senators were mostly 
responsible for keeping positions unfilled or filled with acting officers. The new 
administration, as a result, faced the largest percentage of its advice-and-consent 
positions unfilled after one year as compared with previous ones.56 In a number of 
cases, minority obstruction was based not on doubts about the qualifications or 
suitability of the nominee, but on a desire to cripple the office or agency involved. 
This was especially true for Treasury subcabinet positions. As the President and 
his Treasury Secretary struggled with measures to stabilize the banking system and 
stimulate the economy, minority senators who opposed the administration’s 
economic policies used the appointments process to try to cripple the Treasury 
Department.57 When nominations finally made it to the floor of the Senate, the 
approval vote was overwhelming, demonstrating the real motives behind minority 
delaying tactics. This blatant misuse of the constitutional advice-and-consent 
power, in which a minority of senators actually wielded the power, came to a head 
in 2011 when the Senate minority resolved to prevent two entities established by 
Congress—the CFPB and the NLRB—from carrying out their statutory 
responsibilities. President Obama’s attempt to resolve the conflicts through the use 
of recess appointments, and thus fulfill his constitutional duty to execute the laws, 
and the Senate’s effort to thwart him, brought about the appointments crisis the 
country now faces.  
The NLRB, a five-member independent regulatory agency charged with 
carrying out the nation’s labor laws, has long been a center of appointments 
54 Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
55 MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 96–100.  
56 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
57 MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 96–97. 
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controversies between the political parties.58 Each is concerned that the other’s 
nominees will tilt the Board too far in favor of labor or management. Not 
surprisingly, five of the last seven appointments to the NLRB have been recess 
appointments, as presidents were unable to achieve Senate confirmation of their 
choices.59 But in 2011, an unprecedented situation threatened to destroy the agency 
entirely. The Board had been reduced to only two members for over two years, and 
the Supreme Court ruled that two members were not enough to conduct official 
business, casting doubt on countless decisions already made.60 President Obama 
thus faced an emergency. Senate obstruction had succeeded in crippling the Board 
completely. In order to pursue his administration’s labor policies, and to carry out 
its statutory responsibilities, the President was forced either to resort to the Recess 
Appointments Clause or to allow this important agency to lie dormant in the face 
of a number of adjudicative and regulatory imperatives. The President chose to 
make three nominations to the Board in 2011, but the Senate took no action on 
them.61 Nearing the end of the session, the Senate scheduled a recess from 
December 20, 2011, to January 23, 2012. The Unanimous Consent Agreement 
which governed the break specified that brief pro forma sessions, at which only a 
few senators would be present, would be held every three days, including on 
January 3 when Congress was constitutionally required to meet to open the new 
session.62 The Agreement specified that “no business” would be conducted during 
the pro forma sessions. On January 4, 2012, now in the second session, the 
President appointed his three earlier nominees to the Board through recess 
appointments, allowing them to serve for almost two years until the end of the next 
session. The validity of the appointments was challenged in federal court later in 
2012 by a business that had been subject to a decision made by the newly 
constituted Board. A panel of the D.C. Circuit eventually held the recess 
appointments unlawful on broad grounds in early 2013, but did not decide the 
narrow question of the constitutional effect of pro forma sessions to block recess 
appointments.63 
The second appointments controversy in 2011 involved the President’s efforts 
to put in place a director of the new Consumer Financial Protection Board (CFPB), 
created by the Dodd-Frank law designed to prevent a repeat of the banking crisis.64 
Minority Republicans in the Senate had opposed this new agency, seeing it as 
another layer of bureaucracy burdening the banks. The President’s desire to 
58 Until this year, most of the recent appointments to the Board have been recess 
appointments. For a useful procedural history, see TODD GARVEY & DAVID H. CARPENTER, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43030, THE RECESS APPOINTMENTS POWER AFTER NOEL 
CANNING V. NLRB: CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 8 (2013). 
59 Id. at n.51. 
60 New Process Steel v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 686–87 (2010). 
61 GARVEY & CARPENTER, supra note 58, at 7–9. 
62 157 CONG. REC. S8783–84 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2011). 
63 Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d. 490, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
64 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5641 (2012)). 
                                                     
738 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 4 
appoint Elizabeth Warren, a Harvard Law professor who had played an important 
advisory role in creation of the agency, was thwarted by minority opposition. He 
responded by appointing her to the role of consultant to the Treasury Department, 
where the new bureau resided, which further angered Republicans.65 In May 2011, 
forty-four Republican senators signed a letter opposing the appointment of any 
head of the CFPB, regardless of qualifications, until changes were made in its 
governing statute, making it clear that they would use the appointments process for 
purposes unrelated to the merits of the nominee.66 In July, the President nominated 
Richard Cordray to head the CFPB.67 Cordray, a widely respected former Ohio 
Attorney General, garnered praise from both parties in the Senate, but the minority 
still vowed to oppose his confirmation. The relevant Senate committee approved 
Cordray’s nomination, however, and in a test vote to bring his nomination up for a 
floor vote, he received fifty-three votes.68 Since the Senate’s rules required sixty 
votes to overcome a filibuster, the nomination failed. Once again, the spirit of the 
Appointments Clause was openly violated. Faced with potentially being unable to 
fully implement a key element of Dodd-Frank, the President responded by making 
Cordray a recess appointee in January, at the same time as his NLRB nominations.  
Partisan debate and scholarly discussion over executive nominations 
continued throughout the first half of 2013, and further minority obstruction 
occurred—nominations of new heads for the Environmental Protection Agency 
and the Labor Department became stalled, along with the perennial case of the 
head of the Justice Department’s Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives (ATF) and several other nominations. Majority Leader Reid raised the 
stakes by threatening to invoke the “nuclear option” (sometimes called the 
“constitutional option”) to change Senate rules so as to prohibit filibusters on 
executive-branch nominations. This tactic has been tried in the past, usually with 
the aim of more general filibuster reform, and often results in compromise by the 
minority to avoid a rules change. And so it was in July 2013 when, at the last 
moment, Republicans agreed to allow votes on Cordray and other pending 
nominees.69 As to the NLRB nominees, the President agreed to withdraw the 
nominations of the two members whose nominations had been declared invalid in 
Noel Canning, but Republicans agreed to immediately process and allow votes on 
two new nominees, bringing the NLRB to full strength. Even the ATF, which had 
never had a confirmed head since the office was upgraded to advise-and-consent 
status seven years before, was included in the package and its nominee was 
confirmed. This compromise, however, did not end the partisan controversy. 
65 Ms. Warren was also appointed Assistant to the President. Amelia Frenkel, Note, 
Defining Recess Appointments Clause “Vacancies”, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 729, 731 n.10 
(2013). 
66 44 U.S. Sens. to Obama: No Accountability, No Confirmation, SHELBY.SENATE. 
GOV (May 5, 2011), http://shelby.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2011/5/44-u-s-sens-to-obam 
a-no-accountability-no-confirmation. 
67 157 CONG. REC. S4646 (daily ed. July 18, 2011). 
68 157 CONG. REC. S8429 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2011).  
69 See supra note 38. 
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Further obstruction in late 2013 led the majority to exercise the “nuclear option” to 
curtail filibusters on most nominations.70 This development, however, will not end 
the struggle over executive nominations. Parliamentary warfare will continue and 
may even escalate. Delay tactics using Senate rules and traditions are still available 
to the minority. More importantly, constitutional issues involving the Recess 
Appointments Clause remain unresolved, to be addressed by the Supreme Court in 
the 2013–14 term. 
 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
 
A.   Interpreting the Recess Appointments Clause 
 
The current dispute over the meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, and 
thus the balance of power between the President and the Senate in the struggle over 
executive appointments, revolves largely around a choice between originalist and 
functionalist interpretations of the constitutional text, and over the role of historical 
practice in constitutional interpretation. The Noel Canning court took a narrow 
originalist approach, parsing the words of the text and discounting historical 
practice. Those who favor a broader interpretation emphasize the ambiguities of 
the text, the overall purpose of the Clause, and a generally uniform view of 
presidential practice over much of our history. Advocates of the broader approach 
have included most modern commentators, and until recently, all the federal courts 
that have addressed the issue.71 They have argued that the Appointments Clause is 
inherently political and must be approached with its principal purpose in mind—to 
ensure the smooth and sustained functioning of the national government in all its 
vast and varied fields of responsibility. They have also recognized the overriding 
importance of the President’s duty to execute the laws duly passed by Congress. 
We turn now to those interpretive issues. 
70 See Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger ‘Nuclear’ Option; Eliminate Most 
Filibusters on Nominees, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/senate-poised-to-limit-filibusters-in-party-line-vote-that-would-alter-centuries-of-p 
recedent/2013/11/21/d065cfe8-52b6-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html; Niels Lesniew-
ski, Democrats go “Nuclear,” Eliminate Filibusters on Most Nominees, ROLL CALL (Nov. 
21, 2013, 1:22 PM), http://blogs.rollcall.com/wgdb/democrats-go-nuclear-elim inate-filibus 
ters-on-most-nominees/. Tellingly, press reports noted that when the Senate finally acted to 
curtail confirmation filibusters, 189 executive nominations were pending action in the 
Senate. Philip Rucker et al., White House, Allies Weigh Nomination Strategy Under New 
Senate Rules, WASH. POST (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/white 
-house-allies-weigh-nomination-strategy-under-new-senate-rules/2013/11/22/31664534-53 
8e-11e3-9e2c-e1d01116fd98_story.html. 
71 For commentators, see, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Recess Appointments of Article III 
Judges: Three Constitutional Questions, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 377 (2005); Patrick Hein, 
supra note 40. For courts, see infra note 79. In Evans v. Stephens, the Eleventh Circuit 
stated that it was “the intent of the Framers to keep important offices filled and government 
functioning.” 387 F.3d 1220, 1225 (2004).  
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The text of the Recess Appointments Clause is as follows: “The President 
shall have the Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of 
the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next 
Session.”72 For purposes of this Article, there are two phrases that bear crucially on 
the relative powers of the President and the Senate in the context of recess 
appointments—“Vacancies that may happen” and “during the Recess of the 
Senate.” 
Almost from the beginning, there have been two competing views about the 
“may happen” language. The most obvious interpretation would seem to require 
that a resignation, removal, or death of an officeholder requiring Senate 
confirmation must actually take place while Congress is not in session, but it 
quickly became apparent that the obvious interpretation creates both practical and 
political difficulties. It means that a vacancy-causing event that occurs during the 
last days of a Senate session could not be filled by recess appointment, despite the 
fact that the recess then following could be as long as nine months under early 
practice. There was also the occasional problem of determining exactly when a 
resignation or death had occurred. Those who see the language as ambiguous argue 
that “happen” can refer to a continuing state as well as a single occurrence. The 
first Attorney General, Edmund Randolph, took the narrower view,73 but early 
presidents and other formal Attorney General opinions advocated the “happen to 
exist” interpretation of the text. They argued that the actual event causing the 
vacancy could occur while the Senate was in session, and since it also continued to 
“exist” during the subsequent recess, the President could make a recess 
appointment. In the face of an ambiguous text, they relied on the purpose of the 
Clause—to keep the government functioning smoothly despite the Senate’s 
meeting schedule—observing that the harm done by a vacancy was the same 
regardless of when it technically occurred. Presidents Adams, Jefferson, and 
Madison made recess appointments to fill vacancies that originated while the 
Senate was in session.74 Scholars have debated the exact time this interpretation 
attained broad acceptance, but there was little contrary argument after Attorney 
General Wirt’s opinion to that effect in 1823.75 The Congress itself clearly 
accepted it as well, as exemplified by the Pay Act in 1863,76 which assumed that 
the “happen to exist” interpretation was valid but restricted the pay of such recess 
appointees. In fact, subsequent amendments to the Pay Act have actually 
broadened the types of recess appointees who could be paid.77 Further acceptance 
72 U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2. 
73 Edmund Randolph, Opinion on Recess Appointments, in 24 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 165–67 (John Catanzariti et al. eds., 1990). 
74 Hartnett, supra note 71, at 387–401. Greater doubt exists about the status of 
President Washington’s recess appointments, though Harnett would put him in the same 
category. Id. 
75 Executive Authority to Fill Vacancies, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 631 (1823).  
76 The original version of the Pay Act was an appropriations rider. Act of Feb. 9, 
1863, ch. 25, § 2, 12 Stat. 642, 646 (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 5503 (2012)). 
77 The current version of the Pay Act is codified at 5 U.S.C. § 5503 (2012). 
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of the broader view of the recess appointment power can be found in the 
impeachment of President Andrew Johnson, which included several charges 
involving appointments and removals, but no mention of his recess appointments 
made under the “happen to exist” interpretation.78 
Though the few court challenges that have occurred resulted in decisions 
accepting the broader interpretation,79 the D. C. Circuit in the Noel Canning case 
adopted the strict view that vacancies eligible for recess appointments must occur 
when the Senate is in recess.80 The panel majority relied heavily on dictionary 
definitions of “happen” and the early Randolph opinion and downplayed the 
importance of subsequent practice.81 This interpretation, if it prevails on review, 
would seriously curtail the President’s recess appointment power. Particularly if 
combined with a narrow view of what constitutes a recess, the result is that the 
President will have fewer opportunities to overcome the kind of obstruction and 
parliamentary maneuvering that has caused our current appointments crisis. It 
would demand exquisite timing by the President to ensure that resignations occur 
during a recess and would eliminate the current practice of a resignation followed 
by a nomination, with the recess appointment of the same person occurring at the 
next recess only if the Senate fails to act in a timely fashion. 
The second key phrase involved in interpreting the Recess Appointments 
Clause is “the recess of the Senate.” One view, adopted by the Noel Canning court, 
is that the phrase refers only to so-called “intersession” recesses, the ones that end 
an annual session of the Senate.82 On this view, the terms “recess” and “session” 
are mutually exclusive, and there is only one of each during a particular year. The 
broader view, taken by courts and long practiced by presidents and congresses, is 
that “the recess” refers to the time the Senate is in recess, not to any particular 
recess. Thus, in modern times when the Senate takes numerous shorter 
“intrasession” recesses throughout the calendar year, the President may make 
recess appointments during each of them. 
There are numerous problems with the narrower view that only intersession 
recesses may trigger the recess appointment power. As a textual matter, it rests 
almost entirely on the Framers’ use of the definite article “the” to restrict recesses 
to the single intersession recess that they might have been familiar with. But it is 
78 Hartnett, supra note 71, at 409.  
79 Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 944 U.S. 942 
(2005); United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 
1048 (1986); United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 
964 (1963); In re Yancey, 28 F. 445 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1886); In re Farrow, 3 F. 112 
(C.C.N.D. Ga. 1880). 
80 Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 507 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Judge Griffith did not 
join in this portion of the opinion, given the long-standing acceptance of the “happen to 
exist” interpretation between the President and Congress, also noting that the court need 
not decide this question after concluding that intrasession recess appointments were 
unconstitutional. Id. at 515. 
81 Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 507–13. 
82 Id. at 499–507. 
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not difficult at all to imagine that the Framers might have meant the phrase to 
mean “the period in which the Senate is in recess,” allowing for more than one 
recess in a year’s meeting of the Senate. Use of the narrower meaning was not 
universal in legislative bodies of the period—Article IX of the Articles of 
Confederation, for example, uses “the recess” in a more general sense.83 And 
“session,” whose meaning is inextricably linked to “recess” in the narrower view, 
is not always used in the Constitution to mean only the annual meeting required by 
the Constitution. In both the Adjournment Clause and the Speech and Debate 
Clause, it clearly seems to have the more general meaning of any session.84 More 
importantly, commentators who take the restrictive view, and the Noel Canning 
court, tend to ignore two important points. First, that the Constitution left to each 
house of Congress the power to control its procedures, and therefore to give 
meaning to “recess” and “session” in actual practice.85 The Framers must have 
been aware that they were using terms that they did not define and that could 
change over time. Second, Congress did in fact have more than one session per 
year quite often in its early years—the very first Congress had three sessions, not 
two, and some later congresses had as many as five.86 Many early congresses had 
more than one intersession recess during a calendar year. Thus, there was no such 
thing as the recess even in the early years. While Congress, up until the Civil War, 
usually followed the original practice of having one short session and a long recess 
each year, it increasingly added short “intrasession” recesses as well, especially 
around the holidays in December.87 The first intrasession recess appointment was 
probably made in 1867, though such appointments were not always accurately 
recorded in those years.88 
In short, the use of originalist arguments in the case of parliamentary terms 
like “recess,” “session,” and “adjournment” in the Constitution simply does not 
83 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, para. 5 (“The united states in 
congress assembled shall have the authority to appoint a committee, to sit in the recess of 
congress, to be denominated ‘A Committee of the States’ . . . .”). The Confederation 
Congress was required to meet at least once every six months. Id. at para. 7. It, in fact, had 
a chaotic meeting record because of its onerous quorum requirement. See id. 
84 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 5, cl. 4. (“Neither House, during the Session of Congress, 
shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days . . . .”); U.S. 
CONST., art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (“They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the 
Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective 
Houses . . . .”). 
85 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5. I have written at length elsewhere about the importance 
of the Rulemaking Clause as interpreted by the federal courts. See John C. Roberts, Are 
Congressional Committees Constitutional?: Radical Textualism, Separation of Powers, 
and the Enactment Process, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 489, 522–43 (2001). 
86 Dates of Sessions of the Congress, Present–1789, SENATE.GOV, https://www.senate 
.gov/reference/Sessions/sessionDates.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2014). 
87 Hartnett, supra note 71, at 408. 
88 Id. at 408–09 (noting that three of President Johnson’s recess appointments were 
made during intrasession recesses and that the practice was supported by Attorney General 
opinions). 
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make sense since they depend on the developing parliamentary practices adopted 
by the Senate over time. In fact, the meaning of “recess” and “session” are now 
quite confusing, as the Senate’s definitive procedural guide and a recent 
Congressional Research Service analysis show.89 There are several different uses 
for the term “recess.” Most importantly, the Senate distinguishes between “daily 
recesses” and “annual recesses,” only the latter being breaks in the annual session 
of Congress.90 Senators commonly speak of being “in recess” overnight or on 
weekends when the Senate is in session, but those are only daily recesses, and no 
president has asserted the power to make recess appointments in those 
circumstances. The Senate can either recess or adjourn at the end of a day, and the 
two terms have different parliamentary implications.91 The key term “adjournment 
sine die” is usually reserved for the end of an annual session, but is not always 
used. The very first Congress, which included many of those who were present at 
the Philadelphia Convention, did not adjourn sine die (often appearing as “without 
day”) at the end of its first session on September 29, 1789, but rather to a date 
certain the next January.92 The same is true of its second session, which ended on 
August 12, 1790.93 The first five congresses, in fact, adjourned sine die only at the 
end of their two-year elected life, which then was the March following a 
November election.94 The practice of inconsistent use of sine die adjournment to 
end annual sessions continued throughout our history. Whatever may have been 
the original expectations of the Framers, given this ambiguity and confusion, it is 
clearly illogical to hold on to a meaning of “the recess” that has no basis in reality. 
The Senate went its own way in defining and labeling its various sessions. 
Certainly the Noel Canning court’s reliance on sine die adjournment as the 
touchstone for triggering the recess appointment power is artificial in the extreme 
and exalts form over substance. Though intersession and intrasession recesses are 
functionally identical, under the recent circuit courts’ reasoning, if the Senate 
never adjourns sine die, there can never be recess appointments regardless of the 
length of the Senate’s absence.  
Given the purpose of the Recess Appointments Clause, it is clear that 
distinguishing between intersession and intrasession recesses for purposes of 
defining the President’s ability to make recess appointments makes no sense. If the 
89 See FLOYD M. RIDDICK & ALAN S. FRUMIN, RIDDICK’S SENATE PROCEDURE: 
PRECEDENTS AND PRACTICES, S. DOC. NO. 101-28, at 1080–90 (Alan S. Frumin ed., 1992); 
RICHARD S. BETH & JESSICA TOLLESTRUP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42977, SESSIONS, 
ADJOURNMENTS, AND RECESSES OF CONGRESS 17–20 (2013). 
90 BETH & TOLLESTRUP, supra note 89, at 1–2. 
91 RIDDICK & FRUMIN, supra note 89, at 14, 714. 
92 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 94 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (“The business of the 
session being brought to a close, the Vice President . . . adjourned the Senate to the first 
Monday in January next . . . .”). 
93 Id. at 1036 (1790) (“And the Vice President adjourned the Senate accordingly, to 
meet on the first Monday in December next.”).  
94 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2244 (1798); 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 1580 (1797); 4 ANNALS OF 
CONG. 854 (1795); 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 665 (1793); 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1782 (1791). 
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goal is to ensure that important government offices keep functioning without 
interruption, then the type of recess that causes the problem is of no relevance. 
While intersession recesses are usually longer, intrasession recesses in the 
twentieth century have been as long as four months.95 Distinguishing between the 
two types cannot be made based on their duration. Do we really believe that if the 
Framers had foreseen the Senate’s increasing use of other recesses throughout the 
year, they would have confined the recess appointment power to only one type? 
Because intrasession recesses were not common until the twentieth century, 
except for the traditional holiday break, the President’s power to make recess 
appointments during those periods was not an issue in the early years. Attorney 
General Knox’s opinion in 1901 relied on the definite article “the” in concluding 
that only intersession recesses triggered the President’s power.96 Attorney General 
Daugherty’s 1921 opinion took the broader view, relying on the overriding purpose 
of the Clause, and that position has been followed uniformly since—until Noel 
Canning.97 Presidents, aware that pushing the broader definition too far could lead 
to an all-out war with the Senate, have generally used restraint and have not made 
recess appointments during recesses of less than ten days. Again, there is strong 
evidence of congressional and judicial concurrence. A 1905 Senate Judiciary 
Committee Report on recess appointments did not distinguish between the two 
types of recesses, adopting a practical set of tests as to when the President could 
make recess appointments—basically defining “session” by whether there was a 
duty of attendance and whether the Senate had the ability to participate as a body 
in confirming nominations.98 That test still appears in the definitive Senate 
handbook on procedure.99 Likewise, in the Pay Act Congress conceded the validity 
of intrasession appointments. Adding to the argument for congressional 
acquiescence, a 1948 opinion of the Comptroller General, an arm of Congress, 
acknowledged the propriety of intrasession recess appointments and found that the 
Pay Act permitted payment to those who are appointed “during periods when the 
Senate is not actually sitting and is not available to give its advice and consent in 
respect to the appointment, irrespective of whether the recess of the Senate is 
attributable to a final adjournment sine die or to an adjournment to a specified 
date.”100 The first federal court to address the question was the Eleventh Circuit in 
2004. In Evans v. Stephens,101 the court upheld an intrasession recess 
appointment.102 The point seemed settled until the recent decisions of panels of the 
D.C., Third, and Fourth Circuits.  
95 Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 
52 UCLA L. REV. 1487, 1500–01 (2005). 
96 23 Op. Att’y Gen. 599, 600–01 (1901). 
97 33 Op. Att’y Gen. 20, 20–22 (1921). 
98 39 CONG. REC. 3823–24 (1905). 
99 RIDDICK & FRUMIN, supra note 89, at 947, 1084. 
100 28 Comp. Gen. 30, 37 (1948). 
101 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004). 
102 Id. at 1224 (citing United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir. 1985)). 
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This Article cannot do justice to the many scholarly commentaries that have 
delved into the Framers’ original understandings and to the complicated 
parliamentary issues involved.103 But it ends this discussion with some general 
conclusions. First, the text of the Recess Appointments Clause is genuinely 
ambiguous as to the two phrases discussed above. Second, purely originalist 
arguments, especially as to the meaning of “recess,” are of little usefulness since 
Congress can and did change its meeting habits over time. Third, intersession and 
intrasession recesses are functionally identical and cannot logically be treated 
differently for recess appointment purposes. Fourth, the President, Congress, and 
the courts have long acquiesced in a practical structure for recess appointments 
that, while it may be different from that anticipated by the Framers, carries out the 
purpose of the Clause and balances the prerogatives of both branches. The Noel 
Canning opinion, if upheld on review, would drastically upset that balance and 
significantly curtail the President’s recess appointment power. And if the Supreme 
Court were also to uphold the validity of the Senate’s pro forma session in 
blocking the President’s appointment power, an issue not reached by the panel in 
Noel Canning, the recess appointments power could be extinguished altogether. It 
is to that issue that we now turn.  
 
B.  The Pro Forma Session 
 
As noted above, the efforts of a minority of senators to block any appointment 
of a director of the CFPB and to cripple the NLRB by denying it a quorum of 
members came to a head in January 2012 when President Obama made recess 
appointments in both cases. In this situation, however, the Senate took an 
additional, and controversial, step to prevent the appointments—it employed so-
called pro forma sessions in an effort to nullify the President’s recess appointment 
power.  
Pro forma sessions occur when a single senator in the chair gavels the Senate 
into session, usually for only a few seconds, and then immediately adjourns it 
without conducting any business. Such sessions are often used in cases where the 
House has not consented to the Senate’s recessing for more than three days, since 
the Constitution explicitly prevents either house of Congress from recessing for 
more than three days without the consent of the other. The Senate sometimes uses 
a pro forma session to extend a weekend recess for the same reason, to permit a 
cloture vote to ripen, or for other internal parliamentary purposes.104 The critical 
question raised by the recess appointments of January 2012 is whether the pro 
forma session may be used to prevent the President from making such 
appointments. 
103 See, e.g., Rappaport, supra note 95; Hartnett, supra note 71. 
104 Lawfulness of Recess Appointments during a Recess of the Senate 
Notwithstanding Periodic Pro Forma Sessions, 36 Op. O.L.C. 1, 18 & n.23 (2012) 
[hereinafter OLC Memo]. 
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In this case, the motives of the minority in the Senate, particularly in the case 
of the Cordray nomination, were clear. As noted above, they announced that they 
would block any nominee to head the CFPB. More generally, twenty GOP senators 
wrote to the Speaker in May 2011 urging the House to refuse to agree to an 
adjournment of the Senate for more than three days.105 In June of 2011, almost 
eighty House members asked the Speaker to take “all appropriate measures . . . to 
prevent . . . the Senate from recessing for the remainder of the 112th Congress” to 
help the Senate minority block recess appointments.106 These actions raise the 
interesting question of whether the House was attempting to intrude itself into the 
appointments process in contravention of the constitutional scheme. At the very 
least, they show dramatically how the struggle over executive appointments has 
now escalated beyond anything the Framers might have imagined. 
The facts of this particular recess illustrate clearly the artificiality of 
distinguishing between intersession and intrasession recesses for purposes of 
recess appointments. The Senate adopted a Unanimous Consent Agreement on 
December 17, 2011, specifying that it would adjourn at the end of the day, and 
convene for pro forma sessions only “with no business conducted” every three 
days until January 23, 2012.107 Those pro forma sessions included one on January 
3, the day established by the XX Amendment for the start of the second session of 
the 112th Congress. If we take seriously the Senate’s assertion that pro forma 
sessions are valid, there was no intersession recess in this case, the first session 
ending and the second session beginning simultaneously. But the entire period 
involved, thirty-seven days, closely resembled a typical intersession recess. The 
Senate did not adjourn sine die in this instance, though the effect is exactly the 
same as if it had. 
The President chose to make his recess appointments after January 3, of 
course, because that would make them intrasession appointments and the 
appointees could then serve until the end of the first session of the 113th 
Congress—almost two years. Had he made the appointments in late December, 
they would also have been intrasession appointments, but his appointees would 
only have been able to serve until the end of the new session beginning January 3, 
2012, a little over one year. The President made his recess appointments on 
January 4, 2012, when the Senate was not in either a regular or pro forma session, 
but either in a three-day or a twenty-day intrasession recess. If the President may 
validly make recess appointments during a three-day intrasession recess, then the 
pro forma issue is irrelevant since there is no question that the Senate was in a 
three-day recess on January 4. If the President may make recess appointments only 
during intrasession recesses of more than three days, then the validity of the 
105 Vitter, DeMint Urge House to Block Controversial Recess Appointments, VITTER. 
SENATE.GOV (May 25, 2011), http://www.vitter.senate.gov/newsroom/press/vitter-demint-u 
rge-house-to-block-controversial-recess-appointments. 
106 Letter from Freshman Members of the House of Representatives to House 
Leadership (June 15, 2011), available at http://woodall.house.gov/sites/woodall.house.gov/ 
files/Freshmen%20Recess%20Appointment%20Letter.pdf. 
107 See supra note 62. 
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appointments turns on whether a pro forma session can interrupt a longer 
intrasession recess. The President asserts, backed by an opinion of the Justice 
Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC),108 that pro forma sessions are not 
valid sessions for recess appointment purposes and, therefore, cannot interrupt a 
longer recess. If this is correct, then he has made an intrasession recess 
appointment during a twenty-day recess—between the start of the second session 
of the 112th Congress on January 3 and the end of the Senate’s recess on January 
23. His assertion of recess appointment power in this case would then be quite 
conservative, falling well within the recess period during which other presidents in 
the twentieth century have made intrasession appointments. The OLC opinion, in 
fact, takes no position on whether the President may make recess appointments 
during a three-day recess.109 
Pro forma recesses to prevent recess appointments were first used in 2007 by 
the Democratic majority in the Senate to block recess appointments by President 
Bush, and the tactic was successful in that it deterred the President from attempting 
recess appointments.110 Unanimous Consent Agreements providing for pro forma 
sessions explicitly stated that they were for the purpose of preventing recess 
appointments.111 It may seem surprising, however, that Majority Leader Reid 
would use the tactic again against a president of his own party beginning in 2010. 
The fact that he did may reflect to some extent an aversion to recess appointments 
even by presidents of one’s own party. But in this case the Majority Leader was 
put under intense pressure by the House and by minority threats in the Senate to 
hold up other business. Thus pro forma sessions were employed throughout 2010 
and 2011.112 Only frustration over the minority blocking of the functioning of the 
CFPB and the prospect of a completely powerless NLRB led the President to act in 
January 2012. Even so, one could view the President’s actions as conservative 
since he only acted on this one occasion and focused only on two cases of clear 
obstruction of his duty to execute the laws. 
On the first question, whether the President may make intrasession recess 
appointments during a three-day recess of the Senate, there is no judicial 
precedent, and scholarly opinion is divided.113 The main argument against such 
appointments is that the Adjournment Clause demonstrates that the Framers did 
108 OLC Memo, supra note 104, at 1. 
109 OLC Memo, supra note 104, at 9 n.13. 
110 DAVID H. CARPENTER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42323, PRESIDENT 
OBAMA’S JANUARY 4, 2012, RECESS APPOINTMENTS: LEGAL ISSUES 16 (2012). 
111 Id. 
112 Id.; see also HENRY HOGUE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21308, RECESS 
APPOINTMENTS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 11–12 (2013). 
113 See, e.g., CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 110, at 20–21 & n.117–25 (noting that 
courts may “conclude that recess appointments may only be made during intrasession 
recesses of more than three days”); Jeff VanDam, The Kill Switch: The New Battle Over 
Presidential Recess Appointments, 107 NW. L. REV. 361, 381–84 (2012) (“While three days 
is shorter than most recesses during which presidents have made appointments, presidential 
action to make appointments during a recess of that length is not unprecedented.”). 
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not consider recesses of three days or fewer to be constitutionally significant,114 
and even Attorney General opinions over the years have equivocated on this 
question. While the two clauses are not related and have different constitutional 
purposes, they provide a convenient way of establishing a lower limit on the 
President’s power, once it has been established that intrasession recesses can 
provide opportunities for recess appointments. A powerful argument for 
recognizing a three-day limit as legally significant is that, as we have noted, it is 
deeply imbedded in Senate rules and traditions and in the very definition of annual 
recesses. As a policy matter, the danger of long vacancies in offices has receded as 
a justification for recess appointments over the years, but allowing them during 
one- or two-day recesses seems to push that argument dangerously far. Modern 
presidents have as a practical matter conceded this point by generally not making 
recess appointments during recesses of less than ten days. A court that upheld the 
validity of intrasession recess appointments but rejected the validity of pro forma 
sessions might well decide to leave the question of the lower limit to political 
accommodation between the Senate and the President. 
The OLC memo argues forcefully that a pro forma session of only a few 
seconds, during which there is no quorum of senators present (and often none other 
than the chair), is not a session for purposes of interrupting a longer recess because 
the Senate was not capable of considering and acting on nominations.115 It rests on 
the terms of the Unanimous Consent agreement, which state that no business will 
be conducted, and on the fact that no business was in fact conducted after January 
3. It lays particular stress on the 1905 Judiciary Committee definition of when the 
Senate is in session for purposes of the recess Appointments Clause: 
 
It was evidently intended by the framers of the Constitution that [the 
word “recess”] should mean something real, not something imaginary; 
something actual, not something fictitious. They used the word as the 
mass of mankind then understood it and now understand it. It means, in 
our judgment, . . . the period of time when the Senate is not sitting in 
regular or extraordinary session as a branch of Congress, . . . ; when its 
members owe no duty of attendance; when its Chamber is empty; when, 
because of its absence, it cannot receive communications from the 
President or participate as a body in making appointments.116  
 
This definition appears in the Senate’s official parliamentary manual and has 
been relied on as its own way of defining a session since 1905.117 It rests on the 
common sense idea that the body during a pro forma session is not capable of 
exercising its advice-and-consent power; since it conducts no business, it cannot 
debate or vote upon nominations. It also by definition cannot meet the requirement 
114 See Hartnett, supra note 71, at 419–21. 
115 See OLC Memo, supra note 104, at 13–18. 
116 39 CONG. REC., supra note 98, at 3823. 
117 See RIDDICK & FRUMIN, supra note 89, at 1084. 
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of the Constitution and of Senate rules that a majority of senators must be present 
to conduct business.118 Therefore, pursuant to the purpose of the Recess 
Appointments Clause, the President may act to prevent harmful official vacancies 
under his take-care duty. 
There are a number of other indicators that pro forma sessions are not real 
sessions for purposes of recess appointments. They include the senators’ habit of 
referring to the whole period as a recess, and the fact that presidential messages are 
commonly not laid before the Senate during pro forma sessions but are entered into 
the Congressional Record only after the end of the whole recess period.119 
Likewise the entire period appears in the official record of the Senate as one 
recess, not as a series of short three-day recesses. It is true that by subsequent 
unanimous consent the Senate could conduct business during a pro forma session 
and that it occasionally does so—for example, passing a bill that had been earlier 
agreed to or taking some minor administrative action. In this instance, however, 
the Majority Leader announced explicitly that no business was to be conducted, 
and no business was actually conducted from January 3 to January 23. It is also 
true that Senate committees can and do meet during recesses to consider 
nominations.120 Logically, however, it should not matter that the Senate could 
potentially meet and consider a nomination during a pro forma session since that 
potentiality is also present during any recess. No one has argued that the 
President’s recess appointments power may not be exercised during a six month 
intersession recess because the Senate could change its mind and come back early 
to act on a nomination. Such an argument would entirely negate both the letter and 
the purpose of the Clause. In the end, there is one crucial fact—a quorum of the 
Senate was not sitting on January 4 to debate and vote on the President’s nominees 
and did not assemble for business until January 23.  
The crux of the President’s argument, therefore, is that while the Senate could 
constitutionally preclude any recess appointments by actually remaining in session 
throughout the year—in the sense that a quorum is present and official business is 
conducted—it may not block the President’s power by pretending to be in session 
when it is not. The argument seems compelling. If pro forma sessions were valid to 
block recess appointments during what would otherwise be a recess, then the 
President’s power to make recess appointments even during months-long recesses 
would be negated, surely disrupting the balance established by the Appointments 
Clause.  
 
V.  CONCLUSION: RESTORING THE BALANCE 
 
We can see now that two sets of developments threaten to bring about a 
constitutional crisis over the President’s appointment of executive officers. On the 
one hand, internal Senate practices increasingly allow inordinate delay and 
118 See U.S. CONST. art I, § 5. 
119 See OLC Memo, supra note 104, at 4 & n.5. 
120 See RIDDICK & FRUMIN, supra note 89, at 404. 
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obstruction, often by a minority of members and over issues unrelated to the 
nominee. On the other hand, the President’s use of temporary recess appointments 
to counter such tactics is threatened by narrow court interpretations and pro forma 
sessions of the Senate. Unless change occurs on one or both of these fronts, the 
President’s duty to execute the laws will be seriously impaired. If Senate 
parliamentary reforms allow more speedy and orderly disposition of nominees on 
the merits, then a narrowing of the recess appointments power may not be fatal. 
Likewise, if the President is granted wide recess appointment power, then Senate 
obstruction is not as alarming a problem (though it still has serious consequences). 
Ideally, change should take place on both sides of this crucial equation. We turn, 
then, to specific steps that can be taken to restore the proper balance between the 
President’s prerogative to staff his administration and take care that the laws are 
faithfully executed and the Senate’s rightful advice-and-consent role. All three 
branches must participate in a solution. 
The Supreme Court has a major opportunity to redress the balance in the 
struggle over executive appointments, since it will review the D.C. Circuit’s Noel 
Canning decision, including the pro forma session issue not reached below.121 The 
Court could simply reverse on the grounds that the respective powers of the 
President and the Senate present a political question unsuited to judicial resolution, 
but that course is both unlikely and unwise. Genuine textual constitutional issues 
are involved. Likewise, the Court should reject the argument that the Rulemaking 
Clause prohibits any judicial challenge to the Senate’s recess and adjournment 
practices. Under the Court’s precedents, that is clearly true of rules and practices 
which involve purely internal workings of the Senate, but not those, like the one-
house legislative veto, which affect the workings of the executive branch.122 The 
use of a pro forma session solely to avoid triggering the recess appointments power 
seems clearly in the latter category. So, while the Court could not prohibit the use 
of pro forma sessions by the Senate, it could hold that such sessions do not 
interrupt a period of recess for purposes of recess appointments. 
The Supreme Court’s analysis should begin with a recognition that the 
original practical purpose of the Recess Appointments Clause in 1789 has become 
irrelevant in the twenty-first century and indeed started to become irrelevant in the 
first Congress. There is no longer any danger of federal offices going vacant for 
long periods because of Congress’s meeting schedule. But even in the early years, 
presidents and senators began acting for political and tactical purposes, changing 
the original function of the Clause. With the rise of polarizing political parties and 
the great growth of government, the focus by the mid-nineteenth century was more 
on instances where the Senate was reluctant or unwilling to confirm nominees, not 
where it was unable to. Hamilton’s comment that the purpose of recess 
121 On a practical level, affirming the version of the Recess Appointments Clause 
espoused by the Noel Canning panel could invalidate literally thousands of decisions made 
by the hundreds of officials serving through recess appointments over many years.  
122 The key case on the Rulemaking Clause is United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 
(1892). I have discussed this issue at length in earlier articles. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 
85, at 528–41. 
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appointments was to allow the President to make appointments to his 
administration where “the general method was inadequate”123 should now be 
viewed in a new light—the method is inadequate today not because the Senate is 
absent for long periods during the year, but because mindless obstructionism has 
prevented the regular appointments process from working as it was intended. 
Moreover, the advice-and-consent power was effectively wielded over the past 
several years by a minority in the Senate, something the Framers surely would not 
have countenanced.  
Both the President and the Senate have acted in ways arguably divergent from 
the original intent, often in reaction to moves by the other. But the overriding 
purpose of the Recess Appointments Clause is still the touchstone—efficient 
functioning of the executive branch and fulfillment of the President’s duty of 
executing the laws passed by Congress. Thus recent Senate efforts to thwart the 
Treasury’s regulation of banks in the financial crisis, its effort to strangle the CFPB 
by refusing to confirm any director, and its complete crippling of the NLRB, 
present the same dangers to efficient government as did the Senate’s absence from 
Washington for nine months in 1790. 
To those who might argue that the broader reinterpretation of the Recess 
Appointments Clause is an impermissible revision of the constitutional text, I 
would point out that the Senate has already accomplished such a revision of its 
confirmation power by adopting rules and practices that allow a minority of 
senators to block the majority from confirming nominations. Fair is fair—the 
President should also be allowed some increased latitude on recess appointments to 
compensate. Some might assert, nonetheless, that the Supreme Court should not 
participate in such a clear change in the constitutional order. But despite our 
reverence for the document, the Court has sanctioned or created a number of 
fundamental changes since the founding. Perhaps most important, it has approved 
the transfer to executive offices and independent agencies of the power to create 
binding legislative rules and to adjudicate cases involving private parties.124 
Without this modification of the traditional three-branch governmental structure, 
the administrative state as we know it would be impossible. The Court has also 
allowed a substantial diminution of the Senate’s power to approve treaties by 
allowing the President to enter into executive agreements having the same legal 
effect125 and approving presidential power to terminate treaties without Senate 
approval.126 Likewise, it has allowed the President to exercise quasi-legislative 
powers directly through executive orders.127 The Court has even reinterpreted 
123 THE FEDERALIST NO. 67 (Alexander Hamilton).  
124 For a succinct summary of this much-discussed point, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 327–31 (3d ed. 2006). 
125 See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330–31 (1937). 
126 To be more precise, the Court held in Goldwater v. Carter that the President’s 
power to abrogate a treaty was a nonjusticiable political question left to be worked out by 
the political branches. 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
127 See PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 88–89 (1988). 
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constitutional text to virtually eliminate the President’s pocket veto power. The list 
is a long one, but suffice it to say that there is ample precedent for recognizing that 
the Recess Appointments Clause has changed drastically since 1789 in practical 
operation, but still retains its crucial importance in the Constitution. 
Where can the Court look for guidance in interpreting the Recess 
Appointments Clause so that it functions effectively in the twenty-first century? 
The closest analogy is probably the federal court decisions on the Constitution’s 
pocket veto provision. The Supreme Court in Wright v. United States128 and the 
D.C. Circuit in Kennedy v. Sampson129 confronted the question of when the Senate 
has prevented the return of a bill under the veto provisions of the Constitution. 
Those courts found that though the Senate was not in session during the time the 
President would have to have returned a bill to exercise his veto, it had not 
prevented the return because it had appointed an officer to receive presidential 
communications and the Senate’s administrative offices were open and 
functioning. Their holdings would seem at first blush to support the Senate’s 
argument that pro forma sessions can be effective in negating the recess 
appointment power. But a closer analysis reveals something else. The crucial act in 
question in these cases was merely the notification by the President of his veto. No 
Senate action was required, and it had an indefinite time to exercise its power, 
along with the House, to override the veto. The Court’s pragmatic approach, 
emphasizing the fact that many Senate functions, such as receiving messages, 
could be performed by designated staff, effectively modernized the constitutional 
provision. Applying the same reasoning to the pro forma session, the Court would 
have to recognize that the acts needing to be performed are debate and vote on the 
nomination, which require the Senate to be in an actual session. Following its 
functional approach, it would ask whether the Senate could perform the function 
required and would find that it could not. Thus, as the OLC memo supporting 
President Obama’s recess appointments argues, a pro forma session sufficient to 
negate the President’s pocket veto might well be insufficient to prevent a recess 
appointment.130 
A closer analogy for the Court to use is the line of cases involving the 
President’s removal of federal officers. After experimenting with dividing 
appointees into different categories to determine whether the Senate could restrict 
the President’s removal power, the Court in Morrison v. Olson131 settled on a more 
amorphous functional test—such restrictions were not constitutional if they 
impaired the ability of the President to execute the laws or “disrupt[] the balance 
between the coordinate branches.”132 This line of cases could well support an 
analysis by the Court that placed prime emphasis on the ability of the President to 
128 302 U.S. 583 (1938). 
129 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
130 See OLC Memo, supra note 104, at 22–23. 
131 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
132 Id. at 695. 
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carry out the laws and the need to preserve the recess appointment power in its 
modern form.  
The Court’s seminal decision in INS v. Chadha133 should also figure in its 
analysis of issues under the Recess Appointments Clause. There the Court 
resoundingly rejected a one-house legislative veto of an executive action because it 
had the effect of legislation while not following the constitutional requirements of 
passage by both houses and presentment to the President.134 Some may argue that 
the Court’s rejection of the arguments that one-house vetoes in statutes were 
acquiesced in by both branches, and had existed in great numbers for some time, 
will lead the Court to reject the importance of historical practice which is arguably 
at odds with the text of the Recess Appointments Clause. But there are several 
important differences. First, legislative vetoes, while numerous, were seldom used 
and could not be seen as a crucial issue in relations between the President and 
Congress. Second, there was no textual ambiguity in Chadha while there is in this 
case. Third, acquiescence by both branches is much clearer in the recess 
appointments case. Fourth, the historical practice on the textual issues, bolstered by 
court decisions, was of a much longer duration—since 1823 on one and at least 
1921 on another. Finally, the legislative veto went to the very heart of the 
enactment process, which is a key element in the carefully balanced democratic 
policy-making process created by the Constitution. The Appointments Clause is 
clearly an area of shared power, like the War Power, and some ambiguity and 
accommodation between the branches is to be expected. The most important lesson 
of Chadha is directly relevant to the issues presented by Noel Canning and 
senatorial efforts to stifle the recess appointments power. The underlying teaching 
of Chadha is that Congress’s role is to pass laws and the President’s is to carry out 
the laws—the one-house veto gave one house of the Congress the power to 
participate in the execution of the laws passed by Congress. Yet that is exactly 
what the Senate has attempted to do when in the current controversies involving 
the CFPB, the NLRB, and Treasury policies during the financial crisis. Even 
worse, the current situation allows a minority in the Senate, because of that body’s 
peculiar rules and traditions, to exercise the advice-and-consent power in an 
unconstitutional manner. 
The Court should recognize that the narrow holdings of the Noel Canning 
panel and the Senate’s recent use of pro forma sessions for the sole purpose of 
blocking recess appointments have created a dangerous imbalance in the 
continuing struggle over executive appointments. Accordingly, it should adopt the 
broader approach to the textual issues taken by the circuits in Evans v. Stephens, 
United States v. Woodley,135 and United States v. Allocco.136 Based on the textual 
ambiguity, historical practice acquiesced in by the branches, and most importantly 
on the overriding goal of the recess appointments clause, the Supreme Court 
133 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
134 See id. at 957–59. 
135 751 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1985).  
136 305 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1962).  
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should hold that recess appointments can be made during both intersession and 
intrasession recesses and that the vacancies involved need not have occurred 
during the recess. It should recognize that there is no functional difference between 
the two and that the Framers did not anticipate the emergence of two different 
types of recesses.  
A much more difficult question is how to resolve the question of whether 
there is a lower limit to the length of a recess during which a president may make 
an appointment. The Court could simply leave that question to the President and 
Congress as a matter of political accommodation, like the current unofficial limit 
of ten days. But it would be far better if the Court gave the parties some guidance 
on this point as well. It could start by recognizing the established distinction in the 
Senate’s own rules and traditions between daily recesses—overnight and over a 
weekend, for example—and annual recesses, which are breaks in the annual 
session itself. That would make it clear that the President could not make recess 
appointments at midnight between daily sessions of the Senate. It could, as many 
commentators have done, draw on the Adjournment Clause to hold that recesses of 
less than three days, since they require approval of the other House, are not 
constitutionally significant, and thus may not be used to make a recess 
appointment. The logic connecting the two clauses is questionable, but in fact the 
three days is significant in Senate rules and practices distinguishing between daily 
and annual recesses. It has the advantage of setting a reasonable lower limit, and 
one that few presidents have tried to breach.  
On the issue of pro forma sessions, I would suggest it set a clear guideline that 
brings the Quorum Clause of the Constitution and Senate practice into play by 
holding that the recess appointment power is triggered when the Senate fails to 
convene a quorum (a majority of its members) or perform any official business for 
four consecutive calendar days, Sundays not included. Therefore, the Senate could 
nullify the recess appointment power if it stayed in actual session at all times (a 
practical impossibility), but it could not do so by pretending to be in session when 
it is not. 
Supreme Court action to clarify definitively the crucial constitutional issues, 
however, will not be enough to restore balance to the process of executive 
appointments. The Senate and the President should also consider entering into an 
agreement, embodied either in rules or in a Sense of the Senate Resolution, and a 
formal presidential statement, that codifies best practices in the appointments 
process. The agreement must be balanced, with each side receding from some of 
the practices that have aggravated the relationship. As this Article was being 
prepared for publication, the Senate, in a truly historic moment, amended its rules 
by majority vote to curtail the filibuster.137 It eliminated the sixty-vote requirement 
for confirmation of executive officers and judges other than Justices of the 
Supreme Court. It is too early to assess the long-term effect of this change, which 
137 See supra note 70. I discuss the constitutional arguments in favor of the nuclear 
option in John C. Roberts, Gridlock and Senate Rules, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2189 
(2013). 
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has been threatened often by both parties. Nominations can theoretically move 
faster, though the minority still has many tools for delaying votes because of the 
complexity of Senate rules and traditions, and may now have special motivation to 
use them aggressively.138 Only time will tell whether traditions like holds and 
senatorial courtesy will be preserved.139 Future Senate majorities will be freer to 
make further changes in the confirmation rules. Moreover, it is important to note 
that filibuster reform does not help a president who faces a hostile Senate majority 
of the other party; there recess appointments are a vital tool. 
The Senate should still adopt requirements for the efficient handling of 
executive nominations. I would suggest that committees be required to report 
nominations within a set time, perhaps three months, and that floor votes be 
required within a set time thereafter, perhaps one month. The Senate should also 
agree not to manipulate its convening and adjournment practices, as it tried to do 
with pro forma sessions, for the sole purpose of blocking recess appointments. 
These changes and commitments would be contingent on the President’s pledge to 
limit certain of her recess appointment options. These could include a commitment 
not to make a recess appointment of a person unless he or she had earlier been 
nominated for the same position and nominated at least four months before a 
recess appointment is made. The President should also commit to informing the 
Senate in writing of her intention to make a recess appointment at least thirty days 
before a recess, though that could turn out to be difficult. She could also pledge not 
to make a recess appointment in cases where the Senate has rejected the person in 
question for the same office after a floor vote governed by simple majority rule. 
Finally, the President might well want to reiterate her commitment not to make 
recess appointments during recesses of fewer than ten days. It would also be wise 
for the President to improve the process of vetting nominees after each election 
and for the Congress to provide additional funds to staff such personnel 
operations.140 
If the Supreme Court were to clarify the constitutional issues, and the two 
branches would adhere to a series of sensible guidelines, the current crisis in the 
executive appointments process could be eased. The President would still be able 
to make recess appointments when the Senate refused to act or attempted to use the 
appointments process for improper or irrelevant ends. The Senate’s advice-and-
consent function would be strengthened because recess appointment would usually 
not be necessary. Within the Senate, the proper role of majority rule would be 
restored in this area, as the Framers undoubtedly intended. 
138 See Jonathan Weisman, Partisan Fever in Senate Likely to Rise, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/22/us/politics/a-move-years-in-the-making-wi 
th-lasting-ramifications.html?_r=0.  
139 See Niels Lesniewski, Uncertain ‘Nuclear’ Fallout in Senate, ROLL CALL (Nov. 
25, 2013, 2:49 PM), http://blogs.rollcall.com/wgdb/uncertain-nuclear-fallout-in-senate/.  
140 See Terry Sullivan, Reducing the Adversarial Burden on Presidential Appointees: 
Feasible Strategies for Fixing the Presidential Appointments Process, PUB. ADMIN. REV. 
1124, 1124–35 (2009).  
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Preserving the President’s ability to act decisively in executing the laws and 
carrying out the policies on which he or she was elected is even more important 
now when the Congress is in such disarray. A combination of political 
polarization, intensely partisan tactics, and antiquated rules has made it nearly 
impossible for the Congress to address legislatively the important issues now 
facing the country. Though there is admittedly some danger in excessive 
presidential power, modern chief executives have successfully resorted to 
administrative action as a substitute for legislation when urgent action is required. 
Narrowing or destroying the recess appointment power could have the effect of 
spreading the contagion of inaction from the legislative to the executive branch, to 
the ultimate detriment of the country. 
 
